## 1ac

#### Contention 1: The Wake Up Call

Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) and Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of Law 2012 [February, Living Under Drones, “Victim Stories” http://www.livingunderdrones.org/victim-stories/]

Sadaullah Wazir, teenager, former student from the village of Machi Khel in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, was severely injured in a September 2009 drone strike on hi**s** grandfather’s home.[1] Sadaullah has filed a complaint before the UN Human Rights Council.[2]

“Before the drone strikes started, my life was very good. I used to go to school and I used to be quite busy with that, but after the drone strikes, I stopped going to school now. I was happy because I thought I would become a doctor.” Sadaullah recalled, “Two missiles [were] fired at our hujra and three people died. My cousin and I were injured. We didn’t hear the missile at all and then it was there.” He further explained, “[The last thing I remembered was that] we had just broken our fast where we had eaten and just prayed. . . .We were having tea and just eating a bit and then there were missiles. . . . When I gained consciousness, there was a bandage on my eye. I didn’t know what had happened to my eye and I could only see from one.” Sadaullah lost both of his legs and one of his eyes in the attack. He informed us, “Before [the strike], my life was normal and very good because I could go anywhere and do anything. But now I am not able to do that because I have to stay inside. . . . Sometimes I have really bad headaches. . . . [and] if I walk too much [on my prosthetic legs], my legs hurt a lot. [Drones have] drastically affected life [in our area].”

#### Could you imagine- your first day of college You’re ready to get out and explore campus- you’ve bought all your textbooks in advance. You can’t wait. And then you hear it. The light air plane droning sound of a UAV. Your cortisol levels spike. You sweat. You’ve heard it before. Suddenly, it all changes. You wake up and your head hurts too much to go to school and you drop out.

#### I know, I know – this sounds like a manipulative sob story, but its also more than that because this is how we started to care. we recognize that this story is not an outlier– there are 3000 or so more. That story only sounds like a sob story because we have a default not to care. I always make my 1acs matter to me—In high school I was big on native American affs and now I’m an anthropology major with a focus on Native American studies so I can make the changes to the problems I learned about through debate. Current political questions have brought up the problem of drone strikes- I think it’s a problem that needs to be solved. I’m shocked at our inability to care and often, I catch myself ignoring foreign news stories on the internet and skipping on to the next funny picture- this is my wake up call to myself that I need to pay attention and now I make an active effort to understand what is happening in the world and not let the illusion that all is happy and wonderful continue.

#### I’m concerned about our vulnerability. What if we was susceptible to violence just because I or Vincent was an Arab adult male in a combat zone? It’s impossible to imagine, but I think that kind of impossibility is important.

#### So how does this happen? Why is the default not to care?

#### Contention 2: The New War

#### Wilcox makes an interesting point - we justify drone violence by pretending that we save lives through precision bombing. This is the triumph of biopolitical calculation by which life is protected by and while killing it.

**Wilcox 2009** [Lauren, Charles and Amy Scharf Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Body Counts: The Politics of Embodiment in Precision Warfare, Political Theory Colloquium]

In discourse of precision warfare, the deaths of civilians occupy a substantial, if not crucial, role. The sparing of civilian lives is given as a key rationale (second only to protecting the lives of servicemen and women) for the development and use of precision munitions. In this way, precision warfare is a key component of the entry of biopolitical rationality into the sphere of war. Foucault considers biopower to be the power “to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculation and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life,” (Foucault 1978, 143). Precision bombing, as part of the liberal way of war, may be said to operate as part of the network of biopower through surveillance and precision targeting on behalf of war ostensibly fought for humanitarian reasons. Along with discipline, biopower constitutes one of the “two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (the other being discipline) (Foucault 1978, 139). Biopower concerns the supervision and intervention regarding the biological processes of birth, mortality, health, and life expectancy. Liberal, high-tech wars embody biopolitical warfare, through which the logic and practice of precision bombing are emblematic. The very nature of precision bombing is of calculated risk, of circular error probabilities, that the bomb will hit its target. Throughout the twentieth century, different technologies have allowed the CEP to decrease. Death is rendered calculable—that is, the destruction of the target. Death for civilians is also understood in this framework of risk and probability. As one proponent writes, “[Precision munitions] should be our weapon of choice because it is the most discriminate, prudent and risk-free weapon in our arsenal,” (Melinger 2001).

#### targeted killing organizes an extreme and racist biopolitics of profiling and preemption by which brown bodies are designated terrorists and eliminated according to the whims of the state.

**Goh 2006** [Irving Goh Fellow at Harvard University, “Disagreeing Preemptive/ Prophylaxis: From Philip K. Dick to Jacques Rancière” Fast Capitalism, 2.1 2006, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2\_1/goh.html]

At present, the time of the preemptive presents the targeted body without the chance, or the right, to offer a counter-hypothesis, so as to prove the preemptive erroneous. The targeted body of the preemptive is not offered, and cannot offer, a prophylaxis contra the preemptive so as to delay the elimination of the right to be alive. In other words, in the staging of the preemptive, there is no space for disagreement. His or her speech, phone or logos—the desperate cries (phone) of denial of any (future) wrongdoing; or the cries of injustice of a treatment towards another human being, articulated in a linguistic idiom rational and intelligible (logos); and the cries to surrender (including deferring one's own innocence for the sake of one's safety)—no longer matters. It is no longer heard, as in the case of the preemptive shooting in Miami. Even silence is not heard either, as in the case of the London shooting. The rush of a preemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeks to defer it. The gap opened by a suspected body between itself and the law that promises the security of the territory is already too great. The law and its need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delaying of that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis or auto-prophylaxis.

To allow the normalization of the fatal preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of an absolute or extreme biopolitics. According to Foucault, biopolitics is the control and management of individual bodies by the State through technics of knowledge (usually through surveillance) of those same bodies. In a biopolitical situation, the State holds the exceptional power to determine either the right to let live or make die the individual belonging to the State. Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life and therefore an unconditional right to be alive to a biopolitical capture, handing over the right to let die to the State police and military powers. It would be a situation of abdicating the body as a totally exposed frontier of absolute war. For in the constant exposure of the imminent preemptive, the body at any time—when decided upon by military or police powers to be a security threat—becomes the point in which the space and time of conductibility of war collapse in a total manner. The preemptive reduces the body to a total space of absolute war. Virilio has suggested that the absolute destruction of an enemy in war is procured when the enemy can no longer hypothesize an alternate if not counter route or trajectory (of escape or counter-attack) from impending forces (1990: 17). In the sequence of executing the preemptive to its resolute end, the escaping body faces that same threat of zero hypothesis. There is no chance for that body to think (itself) outside the vortical preemptive. Preemptive bullets into the head would take away that chance of hypothesis.

A spectral figure begins to haunt the scene now. And that is the figure of the homo sacer, who according to Agamben's analysis, is the one who in ancient times is killed without his or her death being a religious sacrifice, and the one whose killers are nonindictable of homicide. This figure is also the sign par excellence of the absolute biopolitical capture of life by the State, in which the decision to let live and make die is absolutely managed and decided by the State, and thereby the right to be alive is no longer the fact of freedom of existence for the homo sacer (Agamben 1998). For the right to be alive to be secured in any real sense from any political capture, for it to be maintained and guaranteed as and for the future of the human, the body cannot be allowed to return to this figure of the homo sacer. But victims of the preemptive irrepressibly recall the figure of the homo sacer. In the current legal proceedings of the London shooting, it has not been the fact that the police officers shot an innocent Brazilian that they will be charged. That charge remains absent. The charge of homicide against the officers remains elliptical. Instead, the plan has been to charge them for altering the police log book to conceal the fact that they had mistakenly identified the victim as a terror suspect.

The possible turn of human life into the figure of homo sacer as decided by forces of the police or military under the overarching security measure of the preemptive divides the common space of existence. The space of existence becomes less than common now. The preemptive, as in the decision of a homo sacer, brings along with it a certain profiling of certain peoples, regardless of whether the force of law or the State would like to admit or not to such profiling measures. The law or the State would deny this unspoken profiling, but the evidence of its real imminence is felt by the peoples who would most likely fall under the category that the police or military would identify as a possible terror threat. And there is no denying that this profiling largely takes on an ethnic contour. And the fears of such a contouring are not unspoken. "Anyone with dark skin who was running for a bus or Tube could be thought to be about to detonate a bomb," expressed a concerned Labor peer Lord Ahmed for the U.K. Muslim community after the London shooting ("U.K. Muslims Feel 'Under Suspicion'" BBC News. 25 July 2005). The irreducible profiling in the culture of the preemptive is happening in the United States too. A New York Times article reports of a police-speak of "M.E.W.C's" under its intense surveillance—"Middle Eastern with a camera—perhaps taking pictures of a bridge, a hydropower plant or a reservoir" (Kershaw, New York Times. 25 July 2005). The nonnative ethnic community senses a state of emergency that works against them, that restricts their freedom of living on without fear. Indeed, after the London shooting, the BBC carried a report that said "many young Muslims were reluctant to leave their homes" ("U.K. Muslims Feel 'Under Suspicion'" BBC News. 25 July 2005). Their right to be alive becomes under siege as they "believed they could become victims of mistaken identity by armed police" (ibid.). They simply cannot hypothesize, innocent as they are of the intent of terror, a way to disprove the charge of the deadly preemptive that (mis)identifies or profiles them as possible terror suspects. As a Muslim living in Manchester says, "How do I know I won't just be picked up and labeled as a terrorist?" (ibid.). The possibility of a counter-hypothesis against the preemptive, and the unconditional right to be alive, become for these peoples, the unthinkable. That is what Anderton in Minority Report feels too once the naming of himself as a criminal-to-be and the decision of the preemptive capture of him have been disseminated. Even with a counter-proof that he will not commit a crime, he resigns to the fact that nothing can be done to reverse the precession of the preemptive, nothing to stop "precrime" from believing that he has not "the remotest intention of killing" (Dick 1997:329).

#### And the moral framework that justifies drones is the logic of the sovereign subject calculating which ones kill and which ones to save. This technologization makes all life calculable and therefore devaluable - guarantees the zeropoint.

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. Tha**t** duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase statutory and or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to conduct targeted killing.

#### Contention 3: Solvency

#### The affirmative openly debates what constitutes a target – this closes the legal space that allows for unchecked violence.

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1504-05

The legal space that drones operate in is thus located in the deadly residue of drone and document. The ongoing silence of the CIA with respect to its drone operations in Pakistan is raising international and national criticism. Recent Congressional hearings in the USA have debated this, with much of the discussion centered on what counts as a legitimate “target” for assassination and “self-defense”. Indeed, the CIA’s drone strikes are controversial precisely because they exist in a shadowy vacuum of accountability. As the UN Special Rapporteur (on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) Phillip Alston puts it, “Transparency is required by both [international humanitarian law] and human rights law. A lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill” (Alston 2010). This led a prominent law professor to suggest that drone pilots could be liable for war crimes (Hodge 2010). Currently, US drone attacks are justified following 9/11, an event that led Congress to grant the President the ability to use all necessary force against persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks of 9/11 (“The authorization for use of military force against terrorists”, Public Law 107–40). In addition to domestic law, the USA relies on international law in the guise of Article 51 of the UN Charter: A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty if either (a) the second State consents, or (b) the first, targeting, State has a right under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, because (i) the second State is responsible for an armed attack against the first State, or (ii) the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory. International law permits the use of lethal force in self-defence in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is necessary and proportionate (Alston 2010:12).

Both the CIA and Pakistani government remain tight-lipped on the drone program, allowing it to persist in deadly ~~silence~~ unnoticed and continually undo FATA’s sovereignty. This is opposed to Alston’s (2010:27) recommendation that “If a State commits a targeted killing in the territory of another State, the second State should publicly indicate whether it gave consent, and on what basis”. US State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has defended the drone program, arguing the attacks against suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban targets are bundled into the nation’s legitimate right to self-defense: “Koh also asserted that in targeting suspected militants via drone strikes the United States was adhering to basic international humanitarian law rules regarding distinction and proportionality. These rules, meant to protect civilians from harm, do not protect civilians absolutely” (Mariner 2010). The status of “civilian” is therefore worryingly undermined by the drone. As one professor and legal scholar at George Washington University, puts it:

. . . instead of apologizing each time the wrong individual is targeted or collateral damage is caused, we should stress that the issue would be largely resolved in short order if the abusive civilians would stop their abusive practices and fight—if they must—according to established rules of war. They cannot have it both ways . . . (Etzioni 2010:67: emphasis in original).

There is therefore much at stake in drone warfare, including the status of those civilians under the constant watch of the Predator; human beings that are so often translated into statistical and targeted calculations. In this sense, our argument is that the US-led attacks in FATA result from the interactions between the drone itself and the legal history of Pakistan’s northwest, enshrined in FCR of 1901. Both of these objects act in concert to produce an exceptional and contingent space. In this sense, territory is itself a shifting outcome of wider political processes. Never does it sit there, and never does it sit still.

#### And this spills over to a public conversation rethinking what it means for us to be political wartime subjects and allowing for a broader outpouring of open grief and outrage at injustice disrupting political order.

**Butler, 2009** (Judith, original genius, “Frames of War,” Verso, 39-40)

So, one way of posing the question of who "we" are in these times of war is by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable. We might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not. An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all. We can see the division of the globe into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war in order to defend the lives of certain communities, and to defend them against the lives of others-even if it means taking those latter lives. After the attacks of 9/11, we encountered in the media graphic pictures of those who died, along with their names, their stories, the reactions of their families. Public grieving was dedicated to making these images iconic for the nation, which meant of course that there was considerably less public grieving for non-US nationals, and none at all for illegal workers.

The differential distribution of public grieving is a political issue of enormous significance. It has been since at least the time of Antigone, when she chose openly to mourn the death of one of her brothers even though it went against the sovereign law to do so. Why is it that governments so often seek to regulate and control who will be publicly grievable and who will not? In the initial years of the AIDS crisis in the US, the public vigils, and the Names Project broke through the public shame associated with dying from AIDS, a shame associated sometimes with homosexuality, and especially anal sex, and sometimes with drugs and promiscuity. It meant something to state and show the name, to put together some remnants of a life, to publicly display and avow the loss. What would happen if those killed in the current wars were to be grieved in just such an open way? Why is it that we are not given the names of all the war dead, including those the US has killed, of whom we will never have the image, the name, the story, never a testimonial shard of their life, something to see, to touch, to know? Although it is not possible to singularize every life destroyed in war, there are surely ways to register the populations injured and destroyed without fully assimilating to the iconic function of the image. 4

Open grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous political potential. It is, after all, one of the reasons Plato wanted to ban the poets from the Republic. He thought that if the citizens went too often to watch tragedy, they would weep over the losses they saw, and that such open and public mourning, in disrupting the order and hierarchy of the soul, would disrupt the order and hierarchy of political authority as well. Whether we are speaking about open grief or outrage, we are talking about affective responses that are highly regulated by regimes of power and sometimes subject to explicit censorship. In the contemporary wars in which the US is directly engaged, those in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can see how affect is regulated to support both the war effort and, more specifically, nationalist belonging. When the photos of Abu Ghraib were first released in the US, conservative television pundits argued that it would be unAmerican to show them. We were not supposed to have graphic evidence of the acts of torture US personnel had committed. We were not supposed to know that the US had violated internationally recognized human rights. It was un-American to show these photos and un-American to glean information from them as to how the war was being conducted. The conservative political commentator Bill O'Reilly thought that the photos would create a negative image of the US and that we had an obligation to defend a positive image.5 Donald Rumsfeld said something similar, suggesting that it was anti-American to display the photos.6 Of course, neither considered that the American public might have a right to know about the activities of its military, or that the public's right to judge the war on the basis of full evidence is part of the democratic tradition of participation and deliberation. So what was really being said? It seems to me that those who sought to limit the power of the image in this instance also sought to limit the power of affect, of outrage, knowing full well that it could and would turn public opinion against the war in Iraq, as indeed it did.

#### And this debate about war in the absence of declared conflict allows us to shift outside of conceptions of war as an event and allow us to conceptualize it as a larger presence. Solves root cause of militarism

**Cuomo 2003** [Chris, professor of Philosophy and Women Studies at UGA “The Philosopher Queen: Feminist Essays on War, Love and Knowledge,” 18-19]

Military decisions are not the clean moral problems described by philosophers of war, such as Grotius, Augustine, and Aquinas, or by contemporary proponents of “just war” theories. Just war theorists take war to be isolated definable events with clear boundaries that distinguish the circumstances in which standard moral rules and constraints such as rules against murder and unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just war principles are applied in proper decision-making by agents of the state before wars occur, or in looking back and evaluating war and military actions once they are over. They therefore assume that military initiatives are distinct events. But in fact declarations of war are usually overdetermined escalations of preexisting conditions. Just war criteria do not encourage evaluations of military and related institutions, including peacetime practices and how they related to wartime activities. They cannot adequately address the ways armed conflicts between and among states emerge from omnipresent and violent state militarism, or in the remarkable resemblance between states of peace and states of war.

Spatial metaphors (in war, out of war, at war) represent war as a separate bounded sphere, and indicate the assumption that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life—a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. At the same time, war is also taken to be a necessary state that is inherent in human nature that inevitably erupts and reconfigures reality. When war is seen as a necessary event, peacetime military practices enjoy immunity to moral reproach, because they too are considered necessary. Whether or not it is inevitable, war is not just an event, because it is a presence, a constant white noise in the background of social existence. It sometimes moves closer to the foreground of collective consciousness in the form of declared wars and documented violence, but it is always present in the form of everyday military violence. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflict is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for some of us to maintain this false belief, because privilege or luck or ignorance allows us to keep our distance from war.

Seeing war as an event is like seeing rape or school shootings or suicide bombings as isolated events rather than as occurrences that arise from specific social systems and values. When we take those things to be isolated events , we focus on evil men, insanity, and our own sense of powerlessness and pathos. Focusing on catastrophic events, movements against war or other forms of brutal violence are exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is mobilized when the “real” violence occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and when it seems necessary to drop all other political priorities. When the war is over, there is simply no longer a need for a movement (and we find that preexisting movements against violence and injustice have abated because everyone has been so distracted by the crisis of war).

But horribly damaging state-sponsored violence occurs regularly and widely, and much of it is perpetuated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Those institutions and agents are not just out there somewhere.

#### And it allows for a broader reconceptualization of moral obligation. This breaks through the predetermination of traditional calculation and allows us to grapple with both the unknowability of the future and infinite responsibility we face in making moral decisions. Only doing so allows us to become moral subjects.

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 166-167)

The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'decision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see. This is no simple absence of knowing. Neither is it an economic account of the asymmetry of knowing. Nor, finally, is it a matter of calculating the logics that apply in situations of imperfect information. Here we have no mere lack of knowledge that may be remedied, calibrated, or otherwise represented mathematically and of which an account can be taken. What I am referring to is, instead, a lack integral to the structure of any and every 'decision'; where the issue precisely is not a matter of not yet knowing but of the unknowable inalienable from knowing itself. Further even, and this is the crux of the issue, it is a matter of that peculiar infinite responsibility which releases the human pneuma in respect of unknowability as such. A peculiar and quite distinctive form of responsibility thereby arises; it corresponds to the very unknowability that invokes it. Since the unknowable is not the not yet known, but that which cannot be known in every act or exercise of knowing, it is attended by a responsibility which can similarly never be discharged. Assumption of responsibility for this unknowability-taking it on-is what makes a 'dec- ision' a 'decision'; rather than the application of judgment according to a rule, or the submission to the necessity of a law, however that law is decreed or described. Short of divesting the human of that very lack of measure, the assumption of which distinguishes the being of human being, this responsi- bility will never be discharged. Here then, too, the thinking of deconstruction reveals its profoundly ethical and political character: through its commitment to think and not elide the aporetic character of the co-presence of the ethical and the political; through its insistence on the inescapability of assuming responsibility for that immeasurable task; and through its continuous indict- ment of the hubristic eclipsing of undecidability by decidedness. For decon- struction is ultimately not an analytical technique. Rather, it is the event of undecidability, simply the case as Derrida puts it, taking place in every decid- edness. Thus 'decision' is that which is prepared to own responsibility for undecidability. It knows that neither 'decision' nor responsibility will ever discharge each other in relation to this Otherness. Since undecidable is there- fore what 'we' are-or suffer-an ethos may arise governed by the desire continuously to make way for the immeasurable responsibility consequent upon it. Such an ethos, it may then be said-I would want to say-is what dis- tinguishes political life. Call this self plural, divided and hybrid, excessive and incomplete. Call it articulation, not an atom, expressed and joined by its difference from itself. Whatever is determined by this condition is no secure foundation for justice or even, ultimately, of rights. It is something more awesome, something from which these arise; the very occasion, in fact the only occasion we know, of the claim of another Justice. The human self is therefore continuously sum- moned the more so it responds to that insatiable injunction of which it is the expression. Such a divided self is the 'origin'-the taking place-of the call of another Justice of which its own being is the very event. Contrast how pro- foundly different such an account of 'origin' is from that, for example, of Rawls' "original position."4' Not a contract but the advent of the claim of another Justice is what distinguishes that event, precipitating also the way of its unfolding

#### **Finally our solvency need not be linear and final – the antagonism of the affirmative allows for dramatic social change because society is a complex system that is dependent on initial conditions.**

Ibañez and Iñiguez, 97 [Tomas and Lupiciano, Professor and lecturer of Social Psychology at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, “Critical Social Psychology,” 35-6]

The Selforganizational Nature of Social Reality

Self-organizational systems are basically characterized by their property of eluding the second law of thermodynamics by virtue of a series of internal mechanisms which, alone, generate neguentropic processes. These processes lead to internally self-generated increments of complexity. This means that we are dealing both with systems endowed with sufficient redundancy or internal variability, among other things, to transform the input provided by the environment into structuring processes and also with systems which maintain their structure and make it ever more complex through the very forces and energies which act against the maintenance of the system. Although this may appear paradoxical, self-organization is not possible if it is not carried out by means of the simultaneous presence of antagonistic forces and mutually incompatible elements. In other words, a system which does not produce errors in its function, which does not experience noise, and which cannot enrich itself precisely because of these errors and of the noise, is incapable of accomplishing internal neguentropic changes by itself. A system which does not produce errors, or cannot enrich itself by means of these errors, can only change towards greater complexity or a readaptation to the changeable characteristics of the environment through an agent exterior to the system, or by means of a programme of change incorporated therein from the very moment of its constitution. One of the most interesting characteristics of self-organizational systems is rooted in the unpredictability of the effective changes which the system undergoes. This unpredictability does not arise from insufficient knowledge of the processes experienced by these systems, from an insufficient mastering of their laws of functioning, nor from imprecision in relation to the definition of their initial states, but it is the result of their sensitivity to random influences and to evolution, which responds to non-linear equations with several solutions that are equally possible.

Bearing in mind the characteristics of self-organizational systems, it seems sufficiently clear that societies exhibit a series of properties which brand them as such systems. I will cite a few:

• Society is neither designed nor regulated by the art or magic of any exterior agent or will (clearly the figure of colonialism does not constitute a counter example).

Society is not implemented from its beginnings by a programme which incorporates the instructions for its functional evolution:

• Society maintains itself, by definition, in a state of non-equilibrium, that is, a state remote from maximum entropy.

• There is no society without social differentiation and social structures. Moreover, modern societies are characterized by a strong internal differentiation with a high degree of redundancy or structural and functional variability;

• Society evolves historically towards greater complexity, and this social evolution constitutes an irreversible process (except, obviously, if society is destroyed).

• As Popper argued, there are reasons of principle which make precise knowledge of the evolution of a society impossible.

## 2ac

### Case proper

#### More evidence – we resolve the kritik because we catalyze a bottom up and public reevaluation of political violence

**Butler, 2009** (Judith, original genius, “Frames of War,” Verso, 9-11)

A certain leakage or contamination makes this process more fallible than it might at first

AND

that will support and impel calls for justice and an end to violence.

#### **The first step is acceptance - their posing of a privileged knowledge cannot come to terms with human finitude. We need philosophical acceptance to move beyond the tragedy of the affirmative**

**Critchley, 2012** [Simon, professor at the New School, Infinitely Demanding, Verso 1]

Philosophy does not begin in an experience of wonder, as ancient tradition contends,

AND

, our finiteness, and this failure is a cause of much tragedy.

#### Their engagement with the political destroys the world to create a new one – worst violence

**Critchley, 2012** [Simon, professor at the New School, Infinitely Demanding, Verso 5]

The active nihilist also finds everything meaningless, but instead of sitting back and contemplating

AND

the USA, without forgetting the sweet naivety of the Symbionese Liberation Army.

### Coalitions

#### Kritik inadequate – doesn’t address complex reality

**Cuomo, 2003** [Chris, Director of Woman Studies at the University of Georgia, “The Philosopher Queen, Feminist Essays on War, Love and Knowledge,” 48-50]

Discourses of complexity are powerful antidotes to views that reduce all truths to linear equations

AND

despite the scholastic difficulties of adequately capturing such analyses in equations of words.

#### And the totalizing nature of their kritik murders our subjectivity – is the sovereign violence we kritik

Cohen 2006 [Richard A., “Levinas: Thinking Least about Death: Contra Heidegger,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 1/3, Dec., 2006, 33-4, Accessed via Jstor]

6 The grim reaper It is at this point that our attention must be drawn

AND

Heidegger which left ethics and other persons behind as merely ontic or inauthentic.